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Sellarsian Synopsis: Integrating the Images *
Jay L. Garfield †

jgarfield@smith.edu
ABSTRACT

Most discussion of Sellars’ deployment of the distinct images of “manin-the-world” in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man focus
entirely on the manifest and the scientific images. But the original
image is important as well. In this essay I explore the importance of the
original image to the Sellarsian project of naturalizing epistemology,
connecting Sellars’ insights regarding this image to recent work in
cognitive development.
«To say that man is a rational animal is to say
that man is a creature not of habits, but of rules.
When God created Adam, he whispered in his
ear, “In all contexts of action you will recognize
rules, if only the rule to grope for rules to
recognize. When you cease to recognize rules,
you will walk on four feet»
(Sellars, Language, Rules and Behavior, §15)
Introduction
In Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man (1963b), perhaps the best
introduction to Sellarsian philosophy available, Sellars distinguishes between
three images of man-in-the-world. Most subsequent philosophers, myself
included, who have written about the relationship between the images have
focused on the two to which Sellars himself gives the greatest emphasis — the
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manifest and the scientific — in the quest either to give one precedence over the

other (Churchland, 1986) or to vindicate a binocular vision (Garfield, 1988;
deVries, 2005; Rosenberg, 2007). But there is a third image in play as well,
one to which Sellars himself gives relatively less attention, and which his
successors have ignored almost entirely — the original image. This is
unfortunate, for the project of naturalizing epistemology on Sellarsian lines,
and making sense of the locus of normativity in the natural world, requires
attention to all three images. In the present essay I will take Sellars’ vision
beyond stereoscopy, bringing all three images into play in the quest for an
epistemology fully naturalized on Sellarsian lines, consistent with evidence
from contemporary developmental and cognitive psychology.
The manifest image is the view of the world and of our place in it delivered
by sophisticated common sense. It is the view that philosophical speculation
attempts to refine. Most importantly, it is the image in which we are present as
persons, beings who institute and respect norms in our thought, action and
social arrangements, in which meaning emerges as a property of language and
thought, and in which this normativity and meaning emerges in the context of a
natural world that is in general governed by purely descriptive natural laws, and
which is in general devoid of semantic content.
The scientific image is the world as our best science represents it. It is the
world of microphysics, of cosmology, of chemistry and biology. It is a world of
natural phenomena governed by natural law. Most importantly, the scientific
image is an image devoid of persons, devoid of normativity, and devoid of
meaning. In this image we have been explained away through the categories of
the life and physical sciences in which the categories of normativity and
meaning are not to be found. These images are, although from the perspective
of the manifest image, toto genere different and apparently irreconcilable, from
the standpoint of the scientific image, quite continuous. Sellars notes: «[T]his
difference in level [of description in the two images] appears as an irreducible
discontinuity in the manifest image, but as, in a sense requiring careful
analysis, a reducible difference in the scientific image» (1963a, p. 6). This
continuity, and the possibility of joining the images, is essential to the project
of making real sense of the possibility of knowledge, sense that takes both its
normative and biological dimensions seriously.
While the scientific image differs from the manifest in being devoid of
persons and the conceptual categories they implicate, the original image is the
image in which everything, or at any rate, everything salient is a person. In this
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image storms are intentional agents, trees and non-human animals are partners
in dialogue, and the universe is animated with meaning and intention. Sellars
suggests that this is a primitive image, one principally of historical interest
from which humankind (or at least that part involved in modern and postmodern culture) long ago emerged, and of interest only by way of contrast.
[T]he refinement of the ‘original’ image into the manifest image, is the
gradual ‘depersonalization’ of objects other than persons. …
A primitive man did not believe that the tree in front of him was a
person, in the sense that he thought of it both as a tree and as a person,
as I might think of this brick in front of me as a doorstop. If this were so,
then when he abandoned the idea that trees were persons, his concept of
a tree could remain unchanged, although his beliefs about trees would
be changed. The truth is, rather, that originally, to be a tree was a way of
being a person, as to use a close analogy, to be a woman is a way of being
a person, or to be a triangle is a way of being a plane figure. (Sellars,
1963a, p. 10)
But as we will see, the original image may be original in an ontogenetic as well
as a sociogenetic sense; the degree to which even in development, even in
modernity, we transcend it may be more limited than we suppose; and its
importance as a basis for both the manifest and scientific images, and for the
life of persons as persons may be more synchronic and more pervasive than
Sellars himself realized.
In what follows, I will begin by considering the mutual presupposition of
the manifest and scientific images, and the importance of this interdependence
for understanding the place of normativity in the natural world and the
demands that normativity makes on our understanding of that natural world. I
will then consider the sense in which the original image forms not just a
mythic-historical backdrop for the two more familiar images, as Sellars’ own
presentation suggests, but also a psychological, ontogenetic and evolutionary
understanding of the empirical conditions of the possibility of distinctively
human life. My discussion is not meant to be a reconstruction of what the man
Wilfrid Sellars actually argued, but rather a hermeneutic argument for the best
way to take up the set of distinctions he introduces in the service of the account
of meaning, knowledge and human cognitive life he articulates in his corpus as
a whole, an approach to reading this text which Sellars the man would have
introduced wholeheartedly. (He was wont to say, commenting on the
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advantages of historical perspective in hermeneutic practice, «we understand
Plato far better than Plato could have understood himself»).
1. The Interdependence of the Manifest and Scientific Images
Churchland (1986) argues that the scientific image is the final arbiter of
reality, in a Spinozistic sense the locus of the ultimate explanation of the
approximate truth of the claims made by the manifest image, and in the end,
destined to replace the manifest image as a way of understanding the world and
the place of humanity in it. On this eliminativist view, the manifest image is just
what we do until the scientist comes along, destined for the scrapheap of
cultural history, just as the original image — on his view — has been scrapped.
Persons, Churchland and other eliminativists argue, are no more real than
storm gods; intentional or normative predication of members of Homo sapiens
or their behavior is no more apposite than similar predication of tides and their
behavior.
The motivations for this view are clear, and indeed have some basis within
Sellars’ own thinking. If science is the ultimate measure of the real, and if the
description of the world science delivers is at odds with that delivered by
sophisticated common sense, we should discard common sense in favor of
science. If, for instance, common sense tells us that whales are fish, and science
that they are mammals, we discard common sense and go with science. And,
after all, science indeed tells us that we are nothing but collections of atoms in
the void, insignificant moments in an insignificant, law-governed universe,
best understood in the terms of physics, chemistry and biology, none of which
has time to talk about persons, let alone moral or semantic value.
I have responded to this view at length (Garfield,1988, 2000) and will not
rehearse those arguments in detail here (see also Rosenberg, 2007). But the
main points of the reply are easy to outline, and are all suggested explicitly by
Sellars, either in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man or elsewhere. The
scientific image cannot dispose of the manifest image because it presupposes
it. Science aims at knowledge, and knowledge is justified true belief (plus or
minus a bit of Gettier). Justification is a norm-governed activity; belief is a
meaningful, personal state. Science itself is an intensely norm-governed
activity, and its deliverances are theories, which, if they are to explain, must be
both justified and meaningful. It is hence a transcendental condition of the
possibility of the activity of science, and hence of the vindication of the
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scientific image itself that the manifest image be in place as the context for
scientific endeavor. Independent of the categories of the manifest image,
science simply wouldn’t be science, and here would be no reason to adopt the
scientific image.
This transcendental argument is obviously Kantian in structure. It is a
version of the transcendental deduction of the categories — the demonstration
that without a rule-deploying subjectivity no knowledge is possible,
recapitulated in Sellars’ Language, Rules and Behavior (1949) and Some
Reflections on Language Games (1954). And that is no accident, of course:
Sellars was nothing if not Kantian. His own conception of the ineliminability of
the normative was drawn directly from Kant (see the epigraph to this essay).
We might also note that there is a second reason that the scientific image
cannot dispose of the manifest. The scientific image contains the resources to
explain the possibility of the manifest image, of our norm-governed behaviour,
and hence of science itself. Explanation in science is a form of ontological
vindication, not a reason for elimination.
But this is not to give pride of place to the manifest image. For just as the
scientific image presupposes the manifest, the manifest image presupposes the
scientific image as its extension and completion, and this regulative role that
science plays in our very self-conception is one of Sellars’ most profound
extensions of Kantian ideas — in this case ideas drawn not from the
Transcendental Analytic, but rather from the Ideal of Pure Reason. The
manifest image is the locus of our awareness of ourselves as bound by norms,
including centrally epistemic norms. These epistemic norms come to us
sometimes in the form of what Kant would have recognized as categorical
imperatives, in this case, imperatives to come to know, to understand. But of
course in Sellars’ hands, the analysis of their imperative force, and hence of
their normativity, has a social dimension:
[T]he essentially social character of conceptual thinking comes clearly
to mind when we recognize that there is no thinking apart from common
standards of correctness and relevance, which related what I do think to
what anyone ought to think. The contrast between ‘I’ and ‘anyone’ is
essential to rational thought. […] A group isn’t a group in the relevant
sense unless it consists of a number of individuals each of which thinks
of himself as ‘I’ in contrast to ‘others’. Thus a group exists in the way in
which members of the group represent themselves. Conceptual
thinking is not by accident that which is communicated to others, any
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more than the decision to move a chess piece is buy accident that which
finds an expression in a move on a board between two people. (Sellars,
1963a, pp. 16–17)
This social dimension turns out to be essential to the naturalization of
epistemology. Sellars himself saw that it had to be; as we will see, contemporary
cognitive science vindicates that verdict, though in surprising ways that make
the links to Kant explicit.
We encounter ourselves in the manifest images as persons. Persons
cannot, as Schopenhauer (1813/2003) pointed out, experience anything
without asking “why?”. We will return below to the psychological dimension of
this demand. But nothing we say or could say under that more empirical head
can undermine the fact that the demand for explanation, for deeper
understanding, is experienced in the first instance as a demand. To refuse to
inquire, to refrain from demanding understanding, is to recuse oneself from
the epistemic community or persons. Not only, as Kant put it, does “all our
knowledge begin with experience”, but all experience is but the beginning of
knowledge.
The manifest image hence contains — in virtue of our representation of
ourselves as persons, in virtue of the necessity of persons to constitute and to
conform to norms, and in virtue of the fact that those norms include not only
moral and linguistic, but epistemic norms — the seeds of systematic inquiry
whose flowering is the institution and practice of science, the fruit of which is
the scientific image.
Thus the conceptual framework of persons is the framework in which we
think of one another as sharing the community intentions which provide
the ambience of principles and standards (above all, those which make
meaningful discourse and rationality itself possible) within which we live
our individual lives …. Thus the conceptual framework of persons is not
something that needs to be reconciled with the scientific image, but
something to be joined to it. (Sellars, 1963b, p. 40)
Without the telos of scientific understanding, the manifest image is
incomplete. These two images are hence not only mutually consistent — as
many have argued — and not only complementary in developing a binocular,
and hence more complete vision of the world and of humanity within that world
— as many have also argued — but are also mutually entailing, and each
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presupposes the other as its transcendental condition. Sellars hints at this
point:
But if in Spinoza’s account, the scientific image, as he interprets it,
dominates the stereoscopic view (the manifest image appearing as a
tracery of explainable error), the very fact that I use the analogy of
stereoscopic vision implies that as I see it the manifest image is not
overwhelmed in the synthesis. (Sellars1963b, pp. 8–9)
2. The Original Image
But what of the third image — the original image? The original image, as we
have seen, is introduced by Sellars as a kind of historical myth of origin of
human civilization. Seen this way, the original image is something we have
collectively outgrown in a trajectory leading from shamanism to science. It is
easy then, to pass over the original image in reading Philosophy and the
Scientific Image of Man, and easy to refrain from asking why Sellars introduces
it in the first place, given the focus of the essay on the tension between the
manifest and scientific images. But the original image repays close attention
and careful reflection, and indicates a tension in Sellars’ own thought that we
may be in a position to resolve productively in the service of his greater
intellectual vision.
Sellars characterizes the human intellectual progress represented by the
transition from original to the manifest to the scientific image as the
progressive “depersonalization” of nature: first everything is a person; then we
alone are persons; in the end nothing is a person.
... [T]he manifest image is the modification of an image in which all the
objects are capable of the full range of personal activity, the
modification consisting of a gradual pruning of the implications of
saying with respect to what we would call an inanimate object, that it did
something. Thus, in the original image to say of the wind that it blew
down one’s house would imply that the wind either decided to so with an
end in view, and might, perhaps, have been persuaded not to do it, or
that it acted thoughtlessly (either from habit or impulse ….
In the early stages of the development of the manifest image, the wind
was no longer conceived as acting deliberately […] Nature became the
locus of ‘truncated persons’ […] Inanimate things no longer ‘did’ things
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in the sense in which persons do them. (Sellars, 1963a, pp. 12–13)
That narrative makes a certain kind of sense. But it invites a prior question.
And the most obvious answer to that question raises a further question
regarding the cogency of the Sellarsian framework itself. Why, in the first
place, do those who take up with the world through the original image
personalize the entire world? What is the motivation? And whence do the
categories of intentionality and normativity that must be in play in treating
anything, let alone virtually everything as a person, come?
We can reframe this question if we take an ontogenetic view of the
transition between the images. We might think of the original image as that of
the very young child who sees not only persons, but also inanimate objects
such as dolls or other toys, as well as animals, as persons, attributing to them
intentionality, mental states and processes, and even moral properties.
Maturation into a reflective person leads us to restrict these categories to our
conspecifics, and indeed only our mature, reasonably healthy conspecifics;
overgeneralization to the severely disabled, the impaired, the infantile or the
senescent, let alone to non-human animals or machines, is seen as a kind of
immaturity. When we become reflective adults, we turn to science as the
measure of reality, allowing it a kind of ontological and epistemological
primacy in certain domains; though, as I argue above, we never allow it to
displace the manifest image in the way that we do expect the manifest image to
displace the original developmentally.
But now we can raise the question posed a moment ago in a new register. If
the ontogenetically original image is one of excessive personalization, and the
restriction of personalization to other reasonably intact Homo sapiens is a later
development, whence come these over-applied normative and intentional
categories? And here we come upon a dilemma, one with an obvious analogue
in the sociogenetic register employed in Philosophy and the Scientific Image of
Man. They are either innate or of social origin. If the former, we seem to give
up on the Sellarsian picture of the categories of intentionality as emerging from
collectively constituted norms, and of the theoretical model of the introduction
of the concepts of inner episodes made famous in the “Myth of Jones”. If the
latter, it seems impossible to understand how the original image antedates in
development the manifest. With an eye on this conundrum, we will turn to
recent results in developmental and cognitive psychology to better understand
the role of the original image.
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3. Empirical Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind
Sellars himself notes the prima facie difficulty faced by any account of the
emergence of conceptual thought, and hence of the emergence of the capacity
to attribute intentionality:
The conclusion is difficult to avoid that the transition from preconceptual patterns of behaviour to conceptual thinking was a holistic
one, a jump to a level of awareness which is irreducibly new, a jump
which was the coming into being of man. (Sellars, 1963a, p. 6)
Here Sellars is focusing on the constitution of the manifest image, where, he
says, «man first encounter himself as man». But we should note that on his own
view, this “transition” must occur much earlier if the original image is indeed
to be an image in which the categories of personhood are at work. This only
sharpens the problem. Things get more problematic, though, when we focus
on the crucial difference between the manifest and scientific images
themselves, in the context of the account of the theoretical introduction of the
concepts of inner episodes such as thoughts and impressions presented in
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. In that discussion — surely the most
influential and oft-cited fragment of the vast Sellarsian corpus — Sellars urges
that we think of these concepts as introduced as theoretical entities — as
unobserved explanans of intelligent behaviour. But the categories of thoughts
and impressions are surely part and parcel of our image of ourselves as
persons, and so of the manifest image. However, even if they attain a
“reporting role”, if the myth is to have any force, the semantic properties of
overt states are conceptually prior to those of inner episodes, and this appears
to be inconsistent with the preclusion of theoretical entities from that image:
[T]he conceptual framework which I am here calling the manifest image
is, an appropriate sense, itself a scientific image. It is not only
disciplined and critical; it also makes use of those aspects of scientific
method which might be lumped together under the heading
‘correlational induction’. There is, however, one type of scientific
reasoning which it, by stipulation, does not include, namely that which
involves the postulation of imperceptible entities, and principles
pertaining to them, to explain the behaviour of perceptible things.
(Sellars, 1963a, p. 7)
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So, if we take the Myth of Jones seriously — and surely that is central to the
Sellarsian framework — how are we to make sense of the manifest or of the
original images as images whose primary conceptual framework is that of
persons, but as devoid of theoretical entities? This set of problems must be
solved if we are to make any real progress in the project of naturalizing
epistemology in the Sellarsian framework. For that involves telling a story
within the scientific image of how normativity and the categories of
intentionality that define the epistemic domain emerge within the original and
manifest images. To solve these problems, it is appropriate to turn to the
science of psychology, and in particular to the literature on the acquisition of
“Theory of Mind” (the capacity to attribute cognitive states to others and to
predict and explain their behaviour on the basis of these attributions) and on
the propensity to attribute intentional states to objects in the environment.
The literature on the development of Theory of Mind is vast, and it is well
beyond the scope of this paper to survey it.1 For present purposes, we can
distinguish three principal phases in this literature. Initially (the 1980’s and
1990’s) a consensus developed grounded in an impressive array of studies (the
classics are Wimmer and Perner, 1983 and Perner, Leekam and Wimmer,
1987, but there are hundreds of kindred results) that prior to the fourth year,
young children were unable to make use of belief-attribution in predicting and
explaining behavior, in virtue of their regular failure in such false belief tasks as
the unseen displacement and misleading container task and their ilk.
Many psychologists early on attributed this to the maturation of a Theory of
Mind module responsible for attributing inner states and reasoning about
them. The regular developmental track for this range of abilities, its stability
across cultures, and the fact that there seems to be in the autism spectrum a
selective impairment of this capacity lent credibility to the hypothesis that an
innately determined cognitive module is at work (Baron-Cohen, 1995; BaronCohen, Leslie, and Frith, 1985; Carruthers, 2006; Leslie, 1987; Scholl and
Leslie, 1999). Arguments from evolutionary psychology led added support to
the modularist hypothesis. After all, if we consider the obvious selective
advantage to individuals able to tell what others are thinking, it is clear that
there would be selection pressure for a module that would subserve such a
function. And indeed we see in our closest biological kin — the other great apes
1

For an excellent overview discussion and assessment of the history and significance of that
literature, see Fenici (2011).
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— precursor abilities, such as the ability to monitor attention and an
understanding of the relation between perception, motivation and action in
simple situations.
In the next decade or so, a second phase of theoretical thought developed,
spurred by the work of de Villiers and de Villiers (2000) on the connection
between language development and the development of Theory of Mind.2 A
substantial body of literature involving both developmental studies and
important comparisons of the performance of language-impaired and nonimpaired populations on Theory of Mind tasks established a powerful case for
the claim that the ability to attribute and to reason about mental states is
strongly dependent upon linguistic development, and specifically upon the
mastery of the syntax and semantics of tensed sentential complement clauses
(Hale and Tager-Flusberg, 2003; Peterson and Siegal, 2000; Tager-Flusberg
and Joseph, 2005; Pyers and Senghas, 2009). While more recent work has
cast doubt on the tight link between complement mastery and Theory of Mind,
and some researchers have suggested a more general connection between
capacities such as irrealis linguistic representation (Astington and Baird,
2005; Clark, 1998; Fenici, 2011; Garfield, Peterson, and Perry, 2001;
Perner, Sprung, Zauner, and Haider, 2003) or narrative competence (Bruner,
1991; Fenici, 2011; Hutto, 2007, 2008, 2009; Nelson, 2009), suggesting
more Vygotskian models of acquisition (Garfield et al., 2001; Fenici, 2011;
Fernyhough, 2008; Harris, 2005) the role of language in passing classic
Theory of Mind tasks appeared unshakeable.
Over the past few years, however, a third wave of theory has washed over the
Theory of Mind literature, inspired by the work of Baillargeon (Onishi and
Baillargeon, 2005) and her colleagues as well as by Carpenter, Nagell, and
Tomasello (1998). A series of very impressive studies have shown fairly
conclusively that pre-linguistic children as young as 12 months old, at least
implicitly attribute both true and false beliefs to others, understand the
relationship between perception and belief formation, act on those attributions
(Caron, 2009; Clements and Perner, 1994; Kuhlmeier and Bloom, 2003;
Mitchell and LaCohée, 1991; Warrenken and Tomasello, 2006, 2007) and
evince surprise when the behavior of others fails to conform to reasonable
belief attributions. (Southgate, Senju, and Csibra, 2007; Surian, Caldi, and
Sperber, 2007) This literature substantially undermines the thesis that there is
2

See also de Villiers (2009) and de Villiers and Pyers (2002).
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a deep connection between language and Theory of Mind. These new results
also suggest that there is a significant innate component to human attributions
of intentionality.3
Nonetheless, these results do not refute the claim that fully mature Theory
of Mind is strongly language dependent, and this language dependence is
important. Children require mastery of irrealis linguistic constructions, of
which sentential complements in English are one class (though infinitival
constructions seem equally potent (Cheung et al., 2004, Perner et al., 2003),
in order to explain behavior induced by false belief, to predict behaviour in the
context of over-riding reality expectations or emotional valence, and to execute
non-spontaneous, deliberative false-belief reasoning, as opposed to the
spontaneous reactions evinced by infants in these paradigms.
Before we ask just how all of this is relevant to the task of naturalizing
epistemology, reconciling the images and explaining the particular role of the
original image in human life, let us consider one more surprising discovery
from the cognitive science laboratory. We noted above that on the Sellarsian
picture, emergence from the original image involves the depersonalization of
the non-human world. Not only infants (Csibra et al., 1999), but even
educated adults, when viewing a video display of geometric shapes moving
about a screen spontaneously describe their movements and relations to one
another in intentional terms (“the triangle is chasing the circles”) and attribute
emotional states to them (“the circles are afraid”) (Heider and Simmel, 1944;
Michotte, 1946). Moreover, fMRI scans of subjects viewing these displays
demonstrate that the areas in the brain associated with spontaneous intentional
attributions to persons are active when viewing these displays. (Castelli,
Happé, and Frith, 2000). How far have we emerged from the original image?
4. Naturalizing the Normative; Norming Nature
Results such as those of Castelli et al. (2000) suggest that we think about the
original image ontogenetically, and not merely as a stage we go through, but
about a primordial mode of taking up with the world. As we mature into a life
lived in the manifest image, we learn to override that basic disposition to
attribute intentionality to whatever moves autonomously or looks roughly
animate, in conscious thought, but it never really leaves us. The original image
3
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is original, contemporary cognitive science suggests, because the viewpoint it
encodes is biologically determined. We have simply evolved to attribute
intentionality. Those who lack this ability are failures in the competition for
resources and mates in human societies. The hard task for the normally
developing Homo sapiens is not to learn to interpret, but to learn not to; to
make the transition from the original to the manifest image.
To attribute intentionality or belief to others spontaneously is necessary,
but not sufficient for full social life. Without that propensity built in to us
(Dapretto et al., 2005; Meltzoff, 2005, 2007; Meltzoff and Moore, 1977), it
is hard to see how we could ever acquire it. But that propensity only scaffolds
and enables, and does not constitute full personhood, the personhood that
emerges in the manifest image and which includes the ability to attribute full
personhood to our fellows. To put that point more precisely, without the
innate fundamental propensities to attribute intentionality, and to engage
spontaneously with one another on the basis of those attributions —
propensities that, as we have seen, never leave us — we could not coalesce into
societies, into communities of language users and norm-enforcers, as we would
never engage with one another as collaborators in this project. The discovery of
this spontaneous capacity and propensity is hence part of the explanation of the
ontogenesis of communities.
Communities of attributers permit the constitution of norms and rules
governing the use of terms, governing behavior, and governing assertion and
justification. And language permits the development of narrative, collaboration
in joint ventures, theoretical endeavour, and explicit discourse about belief
true and false, desire requited and unrequited, action successful and
unsuccessful. It permits explanation, understanding, reflection, and
knowledge in the full sense. This in turn makes the collective practice of
personhood possible. In these communities, constrained by norms and thereby
limited from mere habits, the resultant discourse, investigations and
articulation enables us to acts as persons in virtue of recognizing ourselves and
others as persons — not only as subjects and as objects for one another — but as
rational interlocutors both responsible to and responsible for the norms that
constitute our collective human life (Fogel, 1993; Lewis et al., 2009). Thus
arises the manifest image from the original, perhaps not historically, but
ontologically. The original, from the standpoint of the scientific, hence
explains the manifest.
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And as we noted at the outset, once epistemic norms are in place, science
inevitably follows. The ground of its possibility, however, is the constitution of
norm-governed epistemic activity by beings biologically like us, in the sense
that they are wired for intentional attribution. In this sense as well, even as
scientists, we never leave our biological origins behind. We are in the end
complex animals, but complex animals capable of reflecting in a way that only
emerges from our social matrix, a matrix we are wired to construct, and which
permits the transcendence of nature realized in self-understanding that
nonetheless can be explained as a natural phenomenon.
To naturalize epistemology is nothing more than to come to understand
ourselves well enough as natural objects to be able to explain how organisms
like us can come together to constitute social collectives, and then to
supplement that understanding with an understanding of how those social
collectives can constitute norm-governed practices that enable knowledge.
That is the work of psychology and social theory, and we have seen that while
that work may not be complete, it is well underway. Naturalizing epistemology
in this way allows us to see just why all three images are necessary in order to
understand our being-in-the-world.
But this Sellarsian naturalization of epistemology also amounts to a
norming of the natural world. For in doing so, we come to see ourselves not
only as persons, but also as animals, animals that have evolved to occupy a
particular ecological niche with a particular innate endowment that suits us to
live in a particular — and particularly complex — way with one another. To live
in that particular, natural way, is to live a norm-governed life; such a normgoverned life is hence not even, as Aristotle or Hume would have it, second
nature; for us, it is first nature. To fall short of that life would be to fall short of
what Marx felicitously called our “species-being”.
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